Kannada Quotes For Wedding Invitation

Markings: Microcredit and Macrosperanze

We report the release of the book, "Microcredit and macrosperanze: Opportunities, limits and responsibilities" of Alberto Niccoli and Andra F. Priest (EGEA 2010). The volume will be presented November 4 at 18.00 at the Feltrinelli di Ancona.

Below is a brief summary, while here you can download the introduction and index.

Microcredit and microfinance are widespread phenomena throughout the world allow a lot of initiatives for the creation of new enterprises; level in the time consumption of many households with uncertain and sometimes become a modern form of the charity. But microcredit and microfinance are the panacea for all ills?
When and how do they work? What do we teach the experiences made so far?
These are just some of the questions the book tries to answer in a systematic and structured.
The conviction of the authors is that one must not fall into overly reviews positive (a little 'illusory), one must be clear about the increasing role of microfinance as an alternative to the rampant gigantism in the financial sector. And one must recall a few useful effects, including: the promotion of financial transactions not ends in themselves, the possibility of reducing inequality and expanding microcredit microrisparmio, the importance accorded to not only quantitative and qualitative information, the enhancement of interpersonal relationships and promoting the social and human capital.

Milena Velba Candyshop

A super-guarantor for the credit

We know at least two things about the financial crisis. The first is that they occur with such frequency having to consider an integral part of capitalism. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century to the present day we have had, on average, once every eight years since the end of Bretton Woods once every two years. Therefore, we must have adequate tools to address them. The second is that, regardless of how it was created, the crisis leads to a collapse of credit. This, in turn, reflects two important phenomena: the state of uncertainty about the soundness of the operators and travel to the liquidity of financial intermediaries who want to lower the ratio between assets and equity. The crisis, like war, creates a dense fog that dims the sight of counterparts and makes them uncertain about their relative positions. Not only increase the information asymmetries between banks, companies, investors, authorities, but also between the banks themselves. This marks the seriousness of the current crisis.

The major central banks in the world since August last year, spared no effort in trying to meet the exceptional demand for liquidity. They created the monetary base (later partially sterilized) and with open market operations is with loans, guarantees, with each institution. The Fed has reduced the gap between the discount rate and the interest rate target, has opened access to the discount window to non-bank intermediaries, lengthened the maturities of loans and liberalized the criteria on securities listed as collateral. A resurrected Walter Bagehot could not do without that welcome the way in which central banks have fulfilled the role of provider last resort. Governments, although late, have established programs to recapitalize banks and offer guarantees, whether overt or implied, on a wide range of debt issued by banks and money market funds.

Despite this large input of resources, the credit customer is blocked and is dragging the economy into a downward spiral real depression. The pipes in the interbank market, where the counterparties are buying and selling large amounts of deposits with no guarantee of collateral, are blocked over the payments that go beyond 24 hours. The evolution of the TED, or the spread between the interest rate on three-month dollar LIBOR and the yield of U.S. Treasury bills, gives an idea the seriousness of the problem. In "normal" conditions, the TED falls below 20 basis points (bps). The financial crises in Mexico (1994) and South-East Asia (1997), TED rises to about 70 bp, and during the Gulf War (early nineties) and the rescue of Long Term Capital Management (1998) comes to 120 pb . The subprime crisis immediately raises the TED beyond any previous, for weeks. The growth of TED furiously resumed in September this year. On 18 September, three days after the failure of Lehman Brothers, TED reaches 316 bp. On 10 October, after a terrible week for world stock exchanges and the frenzy of the TED record is maximum of 464 bp. While the Fed to provide liquidity in the money market to 150 bp, if the banks lend to three months if the pay-as-a premium of nearly 350 bp. Monetary policy was frustrated by a tilt in the interbank market, surrounded by a dense fog of mistrust.

Exceptional situations call for exceptional measures. Although late, it's worth considering the creation of a parallel mechanism, provided temporary, the interbank market. The central bank should provide funds to three months out of warranty, at a rate higher than the marginal lending rate (in the U.S. discount rate ) would compensate for the difference the exclusion of warranty on the new mechanism. If allowed, as is the case with the ECB, the banks to settle overnight excess liquidity, the central bank would take a role in the transformation of maturities nell'interbancario "institutional" parallel. Unlike the relationship between bank and bank, the one with the central bank would reduce two pernicious effects that afflict the interbank market. The first is the distrust that now risk brake on the lending bank funds. In the bilateral relationship, this risk would be borne only on the central bank, however, has informational advantages compared to traditional banks. Once relieved the problem counterparty risk, the new rate to delimit the corresponding three months at market rates. The second effect concerns the problem of coordination: the first bank that is willing to lend funds to a second bank in three months if he does not fear that other banks also lend to three months. In the bilateral relationship with the central bank, the coordination problem does not arise.

The new mechanism would help to revive the market for "wholesale interbank flows" on intermediate maturities at interest rates driven by the rates policy . The three-month LIBOR is a reference rate for a myriad of credit agreements, including mortgages. Once stabilized the interbank market, banks would have incentives to reduce the demand for money and loosening the cords of the credit, while central banks could focus on an expansionary monetary policy that reduces the risk of a worldwide depression.

Pietro Alessandrini and Michele Fratianni

in Il Sole-24 Ore, October 30, 2008.

Internet Camera Medion 85081

The dollar and the "dog breed" of Keynes

In times of severe financial crises, such as we are living, returns to history to make comparisons and draw conclusions. The two most popular events of the last century the Great Depression of the thirties and the agreement for monetary Bretton Woods (BW) of 1944. In both cases, we rediscover the thoughts of Keynes, who gave a contribution of ideas to the policy of constructive New Deal and reform of the international monetary system launched in BW. On that occasion, Keynes was a loser with his consent. With pragmatism proposed in the House of Lords approved the agreement, using the metaphor of "mongrel", less beautiful, but more robust and helpful to a "dog breed". The "mongrel" who was born in BW ratified the international rise of the dollar and the decline of the pound. Prevailed over the dominant currency of the country, combining several leadership: technological, commercial, financial, political, military, and therefore also monetary. In exchange for the privilege of monetary sovereignty, the U.S. pledged to provide the "public good" to stabilize the dollar, backed by the guarantee of convertibility into gold.

In subsequent decades, has been the gradual deterioration of these requirements. The U.S. has built up large current account deficits. They have become the largest debtor in the world. The creditor countries took turns, until the situation current that sees China as the main creditor. The value of the dollar no longer convertible into gold, is supported by the convenience of many creditor countries not to revalue their currencies and the U.S. to reaffirm the stability of the dollar standard . The adjustments have been downloaded on the euro exchange rate, despite is the currency of the less unbalanced international trade. Although weak in fundamentals, the dollar is still indispensable. A collapse similar to that of the pound in 1930 would have serious consequences: higher interest rates, global recession, protectionist temptations. There is a coin alternative leader, not the euro, nor the yen and, a fortiori, the yuan.

The international monetary system is based on an unstable equilibrium. Prevails a stalemate, which do not operate the correctional market, because the necessary adjustment of exchange rates would be unsustainable. Neither work constructively with central banks, effectively implementing cooperation passive support of the weaknesses of the coin operated. The exceptional severity of the current financial crisis, which originated in the U.S. and propagatasi worldwide, highlighted the fragility of the global financial system without adequate rules. It remains unclear why the financial tsunami has engulfed the coins. This feeds the optimism of those who believe that the crisis, however serious, can be overcome without substantial changes in the international monetary order. A crisis has already begun, Bernanke reiterated the full confidence in U.S. financial leadership and reiterated the Chinese view of the excess savings as the primary cause of U.S. external deficits. The Fed chairman has thus understood the responsibility on the creditor countries the burden of adjustment: an objective which, it must be remembered, was the basis of the plan Keynes and BW to the U.S. to roles reversed from the creditor country, had rejected.

We share the view of those who think that the monetary system is exposed to dangerous crisis of confidence in the exchange rate, with serious consequences for global economic and political order. The passive defense of the status quo can remove the problems but not solving them. The current financial crisis should be interpreted as a strong warning bell. It adds to the growing seriousness with recurrent signs of fragility avvicendatisi since the sixties when the problem of introducing an alternative international currency to the dollar was already on the table. The answers that were given were ineffective, as the Special Drawing Rights, or impossible, such as the Substitution Account in the seventies. Prevailed buffer solutions in support of the dollar standard .

We believe the time has come to reconsider the "dog breed" of the plan Keynes, who had anticipated the time to BW compared to prevailing power relations. The introduction of a supranational currency, not substitute, but complementary to national currencies (U.S. dollars in the first place ), which guarantees the multilateral debt-credit relationships between countries at an international clearing house and the symmetrical distribution of the burden of adjustment, are the pivotal principles of the plan Keynes. These can offer an innovative benchmark in order to stabilize the international monetary system. The initiative can come from a bilateral cooperative agreement between the Fed and the ECB. The two main central banks succumb to the clearing house equivalent values \u200b\u200bof their bonds in exchange for short deposits in new supranational currency, which has the advantage of a currency basket. Currency risk is thus reduced by the effect of compensatory assets denominated in dollars and euro acquired by the clearing house. The new supranational currency offers a less risky for the central bank reserves. In particular, the Chinese central bank could take advantage and, ultimately, could be encouraged to enter into multilateral netting system. China, currently under-represented in international organizations, could take a weight corresponding to its growing economic power. This system can be set up at the IMF, which retrieves an active role in multilateral surveillance on credit and debit positions of member countries.

's time to replace the "mongrel" with a race in the new BW.

Pietro Alessandrini and Michele Fratianni

in Il Sole 24 Ore with the title "Coins, time dog Keynes, November 12, 2008.

Kundali Matching Online

The Unbearable Lightness of praise

1. At each session, the issue of degree evaluations of the thesis. Problem that is experienced with contrasting attitudes from council members. They range from benevolent , for which not one more vote is denied to any individual ( "are all good guys" are committed ") to condescending, that counter-speakers adapt to the trial of speakers (a little 'as the lawyers office that is released to the benevolence of the court), to the extreme opposite of the strict , which are strict with their students, but are perpetually displaced upward from the game made by' combination benevolent-compliant.

2. If we go deep into sub-categories of interest emerge.

a. The benevolent may be divided into and indifferent fans . The former do not pose the problem of a rigorous evaluation and often only in a hurry or prefer the quiet life. The latter are identified fully with your student (involuntary feeding a conflict of interests: the student is an employee to defend more than one student to be assessed oggettivametne).

b. The group's condescending indifferent (they are the same as above, when you play the role of external reviewer) and subordinate . The subordination is apparent when the external reviewer is in a subordinate position compared to the "powerful" speaker: how can you ask a doc or a contractor or even a researcher, to counter the opinion of the rapporteur, from which depend for their career? The good aspect of this objective lies in a convergence of views, for which the "person" acquires the same meters for assessment of his "master." If so, even better when both are part of the category of strict.

c. But the ranks of the strict tends to decrease gradually. Consequently, in this case we can distinguish two subcategories: the penitent and irreducible. The most common justification is to repent of having to adjust upward to avoid penalizing students. The diehards are defeated at every session of degree: they can be compared to the ceilings in politics, their strong principles, but weakened by a progressive loss of electoral support, which goes to those promises and bestows (irreversible damage in the medium to long term) .

3. I have no difficulty in identifying with the small group of diehard rigorous, with a few caveats, which summarizes: respect, responsibility, trust.

a. The than I express to all my colleagues. I have "fun" to identify those categories, but not moralistic intent. I can understand why many (though not all) of the positions illustrated above. They are often the result of the lack / difficulty in finding explicit and shared standards of evaluation. And because I recognize the good sense and good faith in the majority of individual behavior, but in the aggregate lead to overall results that should be reviewed and corrected.

b. My rigor "irreducible" should be read not as barren maximalism, but as an appeal to common sense of responsibility . The sense of responsibility requires us to adapt to who does better. A serious assessment of merit should be the main focus of university activity. Covers both our careers and the careers of students. All stakeholders (households, firms, institutions), we call for the end of the self, which has undermined the credibility of the Italian university, kept standing above dall'anacronistico legal value of the qualification.

c. not renounce to express confidence in our ability to improve. Also because we have no choice. It is not longer than a quiet life. It 's time to deliver competitive ability in research and teaching. At the central level (Ministry, CUN, CNVSU, CIVR, etc. ..) there are imposed constraints and repeated adjustments. It's up to us to choose between the simple formal amendment of claims (from 5 to 6, from 10 to 9) and the subjects taught (relocated addresses in order to save everyone and everything) and a series of substantial revision of what we teach, how, with whom and for whom. I think we have to follow the second path and I am confident that we can do it.

4. Why deal with the thesis? There's other things to do: review the content of lessons, the teaching organization, the university statutes, regulations, recruitment and selection of virtuous teaching, research, etc ....

For two reasons.

a. The benaltrismo is an evil to be defeated, as worst form of ceilings. Life is like a lost benaltrismo inside a maze: it is idling. Defeat means finding a breadcrumb trail to find a way out.

b. Put the hands of the thesis is one of the threads of Ariadne. You can easily start there and continue to solve other problems in the vicinity. On the other hand, the importance of the argument should not be underestimated in its educational aspects and evaluation. Besides, we can not exclude the possibility of attacking other concomitant problems.

5. The thesis degree has a dual value. An undeniable educational value for the student. To which is added a value of external announcement effect, which summarizes the quality of training and the corresponding underlying validity of the vote. It 's the card exterior not only for graduates but also for our faculty. So there is an image problem not only formal (powered by the legal value of the qualification), but also substantial, involving the credibility of our faculty. We chose a president acknowledged expert in corporate marketing and territorial: I trust that he understands this problem well linked to the quality of marketing education expressed and transmitted also (not only) through our graduates. Their skills must match the degree mark.

6. If these are the conditions, which are the most obvious problems and corrections to be made? It suggests a number: a.

analysis and improvement must start from the data. Requests for excessive praise and background are very unevenly distributed across departments and, within them, including teaching. The latter figure shows the following distribution: 57% Department of Business, 27% departmental office, 16% Economic Department (citing data in mind, the order of magnitude is roughly respected). This would suggest that the best students will redirect it to study business. E 'likely, but it is not credible. Or at least, should be checked.

b. Requests for special mention (praise and / or background) have an internal announcement effect that is almost never denied. It 's very rare that they are not granted. It should be a check to do so. A eye I think that 99% are confirmed in the final vote, with obvious concern in terms of self-referentiality of the speaker (as measured at the beginning stylized). There are teachers who are very easy to praise, often nearly 100% of the arguments presented. All subsequently confirmed.

c. To view declared in the assessment as "medium" (supported by the good will shown by the student) is often ask for 4-5 points. The range is from 0 to 3 points is left to the rigorous diehards, who are the minority, as mentioned above. With obvious scorn for their award-winning graduates who see their friends who have made less effort (often descriptive), it took less time and get more points. There is an obvious problem of fairness. I regretted the strict resolve upward adjustment.

d. There are two vicious circles that are at least resized.

The first is cross matching which sees the same speakers / external reviewer switch roles on a number of arguments, sometimes six or seven during the same session of graduation. There is a clear risk of exchange rate (you do not break the boxes for me, I did not break it to you), compounded in the case of compliant subordinates. Serves more attention in the formation of committees degree.

The second is the common justification for the request of praise "has an average rating so high: how to" . This cuts starting the discussion on the assessment of the thesis. I remember two things about it. The first is that starting from the average of exams is just a practice, now common, but in no case whatever the actual value of thesis. Ironically, those who arrive with an average of 108-109 could afford to simply write down the telephone directory. The second is that the thesis is presented for competitive examinations (scholarships, competitions, etc. ..) and what the value is text. A thesis combined with a mediocre 110 and praise be to the detriment of the external image of the faculty.

7. Everything is clearer if you establish a clear code of reference for evaluations.

a. Firstly it should be noted that the score given to theory is incremental than the average of the votes examined. This means that, for example, give rise to the 0 point of view of those who have an average of 27 (equal to 99 out of 110) means giving a vote to his thesis the average: that is, 27! In the case of those who have an average of 29 (equal to 106). 0 points means giving a value of 29 to view! But colleagues retreat "horrified" by the idea of \u200b\u200bassessing a thesis 0 points, which is equal to 27, in the first case and 29 in the second. A thesis judged to be "media" is rewarded with 4 points in most cases and 3 in a few other cases (the diehards).

b. To be serious the value of the thesis must be relevant to the average overall value of their university career. This in theory means that a student must give a very good argument corresponds to his performace in the exams.

c. Apart from these discussions, but we must remember at the cost of touching the ceiling, code of practice must realistically consider that assessment based on the following incremental steps: 0 =

sufficient argument, very undemanding, 1 = more than enough argument, argument 2 = moderate, 3 = good argument, 4 = very good, 5 = excellent. The breakthrough after more than 5 points and, again, praise must be reserved excellent thesis. I guess that's excellent thesis each speaker does not have more than 5-10% of the arguments below.

assessments must take account of: 1) difficulty of the subject, 2) extent of the required references (bibliography) and the instruments used (books in foreign languages, quantitative methods, etc. ..), 3) capacity depth, 4) clarity, 5) any originality of the results.

8. In the history of our faculty, who is 50 years old, the problem of the thesis has reappeared several times. Sign of its enduring importance. Were placed correctly every time you have appeared obvious loss of respect for codes of assessment or the need to adapt to the times. We have always put a limit on points of increase. Today this limit, there is, is exceeded in most cases. Once distinguished theses B, leaner and less demanding for students who were in a hurry to graduate, A thesis from the more weighty and demanding. At first he claimed an increase in the average 0. The latter had increased by 6 points. Today there is no distinction, with the result of giving 3.4 points increase in the thesis are equivalent to the thesis and B from 5 to 7 and easy to praise the other views.

To limit the claims of praise we have long established a second external reviewer, who often just ignore the additional task. Remains the rule of prior communication. These more than a self-limiting effect before an alleged collective control, imitation has the effect of incentive: see the demands of integration after the first list. A rule that should be considered would be to limit the number of requests for praise-break. For example, not more than 20% of the thesis followed a year. We must move on these limits? I'd rather common sense, on explicit criteria, known to all, and shared.

9. The unbearable lightness with which you grant awards, in a degree which would present higher levels of difficulty levels and more rigorous assessment, I believe it is no longer sustainable. Let's start working on series ratings, credible, accountable and transparent. This good practice to close we also include the assessment of the exam. Last but not least, as soon we will have to evaluate ourselves. As it is right.

Pietro Alessandrini

November 14, 2009

Ftse 100 Market Capitalisation List

The underestimation of the global crisis

that the crisis is more serious than was thought in 2007 we are realizing there month after month in this difficult 2008, which is about to close so depressing and bleak expectations .

The underestimation, it must be said, then was general.

The sub-prime mortgage crisis has not been seen in its seriousness of global epidemic not only at local level but also at sectoral level. It is transmitted by the United States to the rest of the world. From credit to finance. Financial markets to markets real. Demand for goods to production and to depress employment.

We did not realize that the crisis had come from afar. Now we see that go away over time.

Unfortunately, governments have realized that derive electoral advantage from the phases of expansion and have no incentive to curb the financial results of euphoria. It 's easy to govern and achieve consensus when the economy is booming. It would be wise in times of plenty to rationalization and restructuring of bold reforms. Preventive interventions to contain the excesses, to combat waste, bridge delays, reduce inefficiencies, redistribute income and unlock the potential of human and social capital development. Rarely take advantage of this opportunity. Especially in Italy, where reforms have been made only when forced by an emergency situation.

Now that the crisis has manifested itself fully, it is more difficult to intervene, even if it is dramatically necessary. Resources are scarce. Times are tight. The problem is not so much to find solutions, how to activate them in a credible manner and with effects that are at the same time fast and durable. It is a widespread opinion in favor of the right to an expansionary fiscal policy. But it is unclear which resources, in what direction, with what effects. Govern in times of lean is difficult. This is especially for the Italian government which should make it compatible measures to revive the economy and promises of tax relief with a debt to contain at least in the short and in any case to reduce in the medium to long term.

In all this succession of priorities and constraints, the imperative is to act quickly. But the concern is just do not tie in with the soon to do well. The risk is feared that once you do one-off which are palliatives to the seriousness of the situation.

The global crisis has been underestimated even by central banks. Fed and ECB have officially shown to care only in the first ten days of August 2007. But the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis had already switched from the first quarter of the year. For at least six months behaved as firefighters who assist the spread of the fire, hoping it to go out alone. The measures adopted were not only late but also contradictory. The ECB at the beginning of summer 2008 was still working on the line of raising rates to fight inflation. Cost inflation, the increase of stratospheric oil prices, and hardly curable with the rising cost of money that if anything has dampening effects on demand, but not on the tender prices.

Just months after the Fed and the ECB also delay have lowered official interest rates. But he was already fired the most feared phenomenon in financial markets: the crisis of confidence that is forwarded along the chain of intermediaries. A chain stretched to the extreme view to spread the financial risk on so many rings that have proved largely empty boxes. The chain is broken into several parts, revealing a structural fragility of which the supervisory authorities and central banks had advance notice.

The same central banks in their lending, have expressed no confidence, and then passed it on to the banks. The ECB lowered its benchmark rates and expanded the availability € granted by banks in the auction. But at the same time, has devalued the securities listed as collateral. This conservative approach, which penalizes banks, contrasts with the appeal addressed by the monetary authorities to the same banks to be more lax in granting credit nell'interbancario and more confident in favor of businesses.

The banks have behaved in a manner inconsistent. On the one hand blocked interbank loans to a lack of counterparty confidence in the bank. The other asked confidence to depositors, who are tempted to withdraw their deposits, as many have done. To ensure the availability of liquidity to any bank runs by depositors, the banks have frozen with the ECB their cash. More particularly, the re-filed at the central bank's euro bought at auction from the same week. In fact, banks have made a precautionary demand for liquidity, which are hidden under the "mattress" of the ECB waits for events less risky. Operation that the ECB has even encouraged by reducing the cost by half a percentage point to point (with reference to the difference between the main refinancing rate fell from 3.75 to 3.25 and the rate on overnight deposits was 2.75). The end result was to frustrate the efforts of policy monetary expansion. The liquidity has been created, but has returned to the vaults of the ECB!

A crisis started from the easy credit was eventually overturned in a credit crisis difficult. The consequences are paying the firms, especially small, most dependent on bank credit, and employment that are in alarming decline.

A combination of causes, errors, effects and reactions caused this crisis very seriously, by extension in space and time. All that remains is to make a virtue of necessity and hope that governments and central banks should learn from this experience of underestimation and equipped with adequate tools to prevent and contain future crises. Certainly not to avoid them, because with global markets is not possible. He convinced the evidence before economists iperliberisti. And they also admit to having underestimated the crisis. Or to have overestimated the ability of financial markets to regulate themselves. Now rediscover state intervention, but can not be improvised, and mostly first return to preach the absolute sovereignty of the market.

Consistency is certainly a difficult virtue, but it is also necessary. At least that.

Pietro Alessandrini

November 21, 2008